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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and legal practitioners have long debated the virtues and vices of 
integrated models of health care delivery and financing. Few such models have been 
as promising or as rapidly adopted as Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”), 
the latest concept in delivering cost-effective, high-quality health care. 
Implementation of pre-ACO models, however, never required extensive grants of 
immunity to providers and suppliers from the federal Stark physician self-referral 
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law (“Stark”) and other fraud and abuse laws.1 The broad waivers issued by the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) for implementing ACOs raise 
unprecedented legal questions concerning Stark’s application to these 
hospital/physician arrangements designed to decrease costs. Furthermore, the 
waivers represent new opportunities to reconcile, through rulemaking, the cost 
savings of ACOs with their attendant risks of physician abuse or patient harm 
accomplished through Stark-proscribed self-referral. 
This Article discusses: the ACO model and how it works (Part I); the specific 
areas of conflict between Stark regulations and ACOs and their respective 
approaches to regulating health care cost and quality (Part II); CMS’ current interim 
waiver of Stark for ACO arrangements, including stakeholder reactions through 
public comment and alternative approaches to resolving ACO-Stark conflict (Part 
III). Part IV analyzes the costs and benefits of addressing ACO-Stark conflict 
through a temporary waiver versus ex ante reconciliation of the two regimes. It 
recommends that CMS maintain the current waiver with additional safeguards to 
mitigate Stark risks, and consult findings from the 2012 empirical data collected 
before taking further action. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS 
This section provides a general survey of Accountable Care Organizations 
(“ACOs”). It discusses what an ACO is, how it is structured and operated, and 
current empirical results regarding ACOs’ effects on cost and quality of health care 
services delivered.   
A.  What is an Accountable Care Organization? 
An Accountable Care Organization (“ACO”) is a group of medical providers and 
suppliers that work together to manage and coordinate care for a patient population.2 
The Medicare Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”), authorized under the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”), gives providers and suppliers the option to create such a 
structure for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.3 In exchange for reducing 
medical costs and maintaining quality of care at or beyond a level specified by CMS, 
the ACO providers and suppliers receive a share of cost savings realized through 
voluntarily implementing various service delivery reforms.4 These include processes 
to promote evidence-based medicine, sharing of electronic health records (“EHR”), 
joint decision-making and governance, and care coordination processes.5 More 
generally, the ACA statute outlines ACO objectives, which are to: promote 
accountability, encourage investment in infrastructure, coordinate provision of 
                                                          
 
1
 See Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 
67992, 67999 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. IV & 42 C.F.R. ch. V). 
 
2
 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 211-12 
(West 2012). 
 
3
 See id.; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 67,802, 67814-15 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). 
 
4
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 212-14. 
 
5
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 215; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable 
Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67815-16 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 425). 
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Medicare services, and redesign care processes for high quality and efficient service 
delivery.6 
ACOs have adopted a variety of innovative methods for integrating care and 
reducing costs for specific patient populations. Studies based on ACO pilot 
demonstrations present a plethora of qualitative findings of provider-specific 
approaches to accomplishing ACO goals.7 These include registries reminding 
providers to follow-up with at-risk patients, telephone monitoring to check-up on at-
risk patients, care management to individualize and coordinate services for specific 
at-risk individuals, EHR implementation and utilization, and reviewing clinical 
dashboards to track and measure quality and cost performance.8  
There are a number of legal requirements for ACOs, including that they have an 
established mechanism for shared governance providing all ACO participants with 
proportionate control over decision-making.9 Additionally, prospective ACOs must 
apply to CMS to receive approval for operation, and must operate at least three years 
following approval with the option for renewal.10 ACO performance in the areas of 
cost reduction and quality of care is reported and evaluated on an annual basis.11 
Within an ACO, individual Medicare beneficiaries are “attributed” to the primary 
care physician from whom they receive most of their primary care services.12 CMS 
creates a list of patients likely to receive care from the ACO based on recent 
utilization patterns.13 Beneficiaries do not receive advance notice of their attribution 
to an ACO but providers must provide signage in their facilities to notify these 
patients.14 However, ACO beneficiaries may always choose to receive health 
benefits from providers outside the ACO to which they are attributed.15 These costs 
are nonetheless considered in calculating the ACO’s total cost savings and quality 
performance.16 
                                                          
 
6
 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj (West 2012) (outlining statutory goals for providers). 
 
7
 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration: Physicians Groups Continue to Improve Quality and Generate Savings Under 
Medicare Physician Pay-for-Performance Demonstration 1-6 (2011), available at http://www 
.cms.gov/Medicare/Demonstration-Projects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/ downloads/PGP_Fact_Sh 
eet.pdf; Bridget K. Larson et al., Insights from Transformations Under Way At Four 
Brookings-Dartmouth Accountable Care Organization Pilot Sites, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2395, 
2396 (2012). 
 
8
 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 7, at 6-9. 
 
9
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 213.  
 
10
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 213. 
 
11
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 213, 215. 
 
12
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 213. 
 
13
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 213. 
 
14
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 213. 
 
15
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 213. 
 
16
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 214. 
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B.  Structure and Operations 
ACOs may be legally formed under a myriad of state law entities, including: 
limited liability corporations (“LLCs”), professional corporations, and not-for-profit 
501(c)(3) organizations.17 Regulations make it clear that any state authorized entity 
is sufficient so long as it can perform ACO functions and incorporate all participants 
in decision-making.18 The legal choice is closely related to the practical structure of 
the organization. For example, an LLC, with its more flexible rules on allocating 
members’ liabilities and income and pass-through tax benefits, might make more 
sense for a loose confederation of physicians, whereas a 501(c)(3) might be best for 
a large, centralized hospital system.19 
In an attempt to avoid unnecessary costly restructuring, many ACOs choose to 
retain an existing legal status adopted prior to its formation rather than to create a 
new entity.20 Notably, CMS regulations indicate that an ACO formed between two 
or more otherwise independent participants, such as a hospital and independent 
physician groups, must nonetheless establish a separate legal entity and obtain a Tax 
Identification Number (“TIN”) to qualify as an ACO.21 This provides a mechanism 
by which to distribute savings to all participants and ensure that all participants have 
access to the organization’s governance. Such entities would not, however, be 
required to obtain or bill through a Medicare provider number.22 
Distinct from the legal choice of entity, ACOs may be organized and structured 
in a number of different ways. An ACO may be a single independent medical 
practice association of physicians with no owned hospitals. For example, Monarch 
HealthCare in Irvine, CA operates as an independent practice association ACO.23 It 
is incorporated as a professional corporation and serves 172,000 patients annually.24 
Less than 2% of the physicians are employed by the ACO; the remaining physicians, 
                                                          
 
17
 See Larson, supra note 7, at 2397-98. 
 
18
 See Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 
67,802, 67815-16 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). 
 
19
 Janet E. Gitterman & Marvin Friedlander, Health Care Provider Reference Guide, 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT 2-3 (2004), http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc04.pdf (last visited May 26, 2013); Dennis Murray, S Corp, 
C Corp, LLC, LLP – Which Is Best?, MEDICAL ECONOMICS (Mar. 5, 2004), http://www.mode 
rnmedicine.com/news/s-corp-c-corp-llc-llp%C2%97which-best (last visited May 26, 2013). 
 
20
 In a recent study of non-MSSP ACO pilot demonstrations from the Brookings-
Dartmouth Collaborative, three of the four ACOs evaluated elected to retain an existing legal 
status. See Larson, supra note 7, at 2397-2398. 
 
21
 See Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 
67,802, 67815 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). 
 
22
 See Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 
67,802, 67814 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). 
 
23
 Please note all the ACOs referenced for organizational structure were participants in the 
Brookings-Dartmouth Accountable Care Organization (ACO) Pilot Series and are not MSSP 
ACOs, which are being implemented and studied in 2012. The observations are based on a 
study conducted by Larson. Larson, supra note 7, at 2396. 
 
24
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397-98. 
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roughly 98%, are affiliated with the organization.25 All the physicians participating 
in the ACO are primary care practitioners.26 All the organization’s revenues are 
derived from outcomes-based contracts.27 
Alternately, an ACO may consist of an affiliated group of medical providers 
working together such as a multi-specialty group practice. For example, HealthCare 
Partners in Torrance, CA operates as a medical group practice ACO.28 It is 
incorporated as a limited liability company and is physician-owned and governed.29 
The ACO serves 675,000 patients annually.30 Nearly one quarter, 23%, of the 
physicians practicing there are employed by the ACO; the remaining 77% are 
affiliated with the organization.31 Of the physicians in the ACO, 37% are primary 
care physicians and 63% are specialty practitioners.32 Nearly all the organization’s 
revenues, 94%, are derived from outcomes-based contracts.33 
An ACO might also be an entire regional hospital system that itself owns all 
participating hospitals and physician practices. For example, Tucson Medical Center 
in Tucson, AZ operates as a community hospital system ACO.34 It was initially 
incorporated as a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization governed through a board of 
trustees, of which 25% were physicians.35 However, to partner with physicians in the 
ACO, it created a separate limited liability company (LLC).36 The LLC’s board of 
directors is composed of 20% hospital representation and 80% physician practice 
group representation.37 The ACO serves 210,000 patients annually.38 Fewer than 2% 
of the physicians practicing there are employed by the ACO; the remaining 98% are 
affiliated with the ACO.39 Of the physicians, 61% are primary care physicians and 
39% are specialty practitioners.40 The ACO owns two hospitals and has no prior 
experience with risk-sharing contracts.41 Only 8% of the ACO’s revenues are 
                                                          
 
25
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397-98. 
 
26
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2398. 
 
27
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
28
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
29
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
30
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
31
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
32
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2398. 
 
33
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
34
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
35
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
36
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
37
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2398. 
 
38
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
39
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
40
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2398.  
 
41
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
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derived from outcomes-based contracts due to the high level of integration and 
service delivery taking place internally.42 
An ACO may consist of an integrated delivery network (“IDN”) that owns not 
only hospitals and physician practices but also health plans. For example, Norton 
Healthcare in Louisville, KY operates as an integrated delivery network ACO.43 It 
serves 444,261 patients annually and is incorporated as a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit 
organization governed by a board of trustees, of which 18% are physicians.44 100% 
of its physicians are employed by the ACO, which owns a total of five hospitals and 
has no prior experience with risk-sharing contracts.45 Of the physicians, 71% are 
primary care physicians and 29% are specialty practitioners.46 None of the revenues 
are derived from outcomes-based contracting, as everything takes place internally 
and the ACO owns all of its providers.47 
An ACO may also consist of a joint venture or partnership between physician 
practices and hospitals to deliver care to patients in a geographic region. The 
definition of ACO was expanded by HHS in 2011 to include federally funded health 
care providers such as Rural Health Clinics, Critical Access Hospitals, and Federally 
Qualified Health Centers.48 As of 2012, there are an estimated 164 ACOs 
nationwide, including commercial and CMS-sponsored entities.49 Of these, 99 are 
hospital-based systems, 38 are independent physician associations, and 27 are 
organized under a commercial insurer.50 Of the ACOs thus far approved by CMS 
under the MSSP, there are 116 and a majority are physician-led organizations.51 
This, however, is likely to change in the future as hospitals increasingly assume 
control of both private and CMS-sponsored ACOs.52  
ACOs organized as medical groups may often be affiliated with a nearby 
hospital.53 Groups are typically well-situated to coordinate service delivery and share 
information in an ACO structure.54 This is because often the entities already employ 
many physicians in the group and coordinate through intra-group computerized 
medical records.55 In integrated delivery networks, providers, insurers, and patients 
                                                          
 
42
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397, 2399. 
 
43
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
44
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
45
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
46
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
47
 Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
48
 See Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 
67,802, 67806, 961 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). 
 
49
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 253. 
 
50
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 253. 
 
51
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 253. 
 
52
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 253. 
 
53
 See Furrow, supra note 2. 
 
54
 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 7, at 3. 
 
55
 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 7, at 3.  
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are likewise well-connected through streamlined electronic health records.56 This 
structure may create even greater incentives for ACO participants to work together 
because payors have buy-in and input in designing and implementing cost reduction 
measures and strategies for meeting quality benchmarks.57  
Hospital-centric ACO models might have a more difficult time bearing the risk 
of failing to meet performance objectives given their traditional Medicare fee-for-
service reimbursement under Part A.58 Fee-for-service payment, even if capped for 
episodes of care, does not encourage hospitals to share risk for meeting cost or 
quality objectives or otherwise limit services per patient. Hospital-based models may 
include medical staff organizations, where physicians are affiliated with hospital 
facilities and resources, or physician/hospital organizations, a collaborative 
hospital/physician system that includes physicians outside the medical staff.59 
Physician-centric models, on the other hand, may find this transition to be less 
difficult given that many are currently paid capitated amounts per patient under 
managed care contracts.60 Because they are used to controlling costs in this fashion, 
a fee-for-service-plus-bonus structure under ACOs would likely be easier to comply 
with.  
For tax-exempt entities such as many hospitals participating in ACOs, their 
contribution of facilities, infrastructure, or services to the ACO at less than fair 
market value might run afoul of private inurement doctrine under the federal tax 
laws.61 This doctrine regulates not-for-profit entities going beyond statutory tax-
exempt purposes to pursue private ends—in this case, receiving bonuses from CMS 
for its cost reductions.62 The risk of ACOs falling within inurement doctrine’s ambit 
can be mitigated through satisfying a number of criteria, including memorializing the 
arrangement in a written agreement and sharing benefits and losses proportionate to 
an ACO participant’s interest in the ACO.63 
Some ACOs fully employ all participating physicians whereas others employ 
only a few physicians and maintain loose affiliations with several others.64 Many 
ACOs include private insurers as members, who collaborate with providers and 
contribute valuable infrastructure such as EHR.65 Some ACOs are comprised of a 
high proportion of specialist physicians, whereas others contain no or very few 
specialists.66 ACOs may be owned or governed by a committee consisting of 
                                                          
 
56
 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 7, at 3. 
 
57
 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 7, at 3. 
 
58
 These observations are based on a study of early ACO models implemented under the 
Brookings-Dartmouth Pilot Series. See Larson, supra note 7, at 2399. 
 
59
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 253. 
 
60
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 254. 
 
61
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 257-58. 
 
62
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 257-58. 
 
63
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 257-58. 
 
64
 See Larson, supra note 7, at 2399. 
 
65
 See Larson, supra note 7, at 2397. 
 
66
 See Larson, supra note 7, at 2395, 2398. 
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exclusively physicians or an appointed board of directors comprised of mainly non-
physicians.67 The ACA statute does require that ACO participants, including 
providers, control at least 75% of the entity’s governance.68 
The proportion of an ACO’s total revenue derived from health outcomes-based 
contracts can vary from ACO to ACO, with some generating all of it from these 
contracts and others generating none.69 This variation occurs because some ACOs 
employ all their providers such that contracting is unnecessary whereas others 
contract with nearby physician practices to deliver designated services.70 Most ACOs 
currently starting up are in regions without existing integrated delivery networks 
with experience coordinating care.71 As a result, these entities are more likely to rely 
on outcomes-based contracting rather than complex health care integration to 
connect disparate providers.72  
Every ACO is governed by a Participation Agreement that is signed by all ACO 
participants.73 Key elements of the Participation Agreement are: duration of 
participation; agreed-upon performance measures; general model of provider 
payment (e.g., two-sided v. one-sided); and patient assignment system of allocating 
certain patients (e.g., at-risk beneficiaries) to specific providers.74 Other provisions 
might include maintenance of and access to electronic health records, certification of 
accuracy of medical information transmitted to CMS, and assurance of compliance 
with all applicable health laws and regulations, including the federal Stark Law.75 
ACOs may choose between “one-sided” or “two-sided” payment models for 
providers for the initial three-year agreement period.76 According to researchers, 
one-sided models were more popular among a sample of ACOs formed and operated 
as part of the early ACO demonstration projects.77 In a “one-sided” model, ACOs 
bear no financial risk for failing to meet program requirements in years one and two 
but stand to benefit from any savings realized.78 The ACO assumes greater risk in 
                                                          
 
67
 See Larson, supra note 7, at 2398. 
 
68
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 252. 
 
69
 This is based on a recent study of early ACO pilot demonstrations implemented and not 
actual MSSP ACOs being implemented in 2012. See Larson, supra note 7, at 2395-2404. 
 
70
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 253. 
 
71
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 253. 
 
72
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 253. 
 
73
 See Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared Savings Program, Ctrs. for Medicare 
& Medicaid Servs., 76 Fed. Reg. 67992, 67997 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. 
IV & 42 C.F.R. ch. V). 
 
74
 See id. 
 
75
 See id. 
 
76
 FURROW, supra note 2, at 214. 
 
77
 See Larson, supra note 7, at 2397, 2399. 
 
78
 See FURROW, supra note 2, at 214; Jennifer O. Mitchell & Tyler N. Williams, Final 
ACO Rule: Retooled Risk and Reward Model – But is it Still Too Risky?, ABA HEALTH 
ESOURCE (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba 
_health_esource_home/aba_health_law_esource_1211_aco_mitchell.html. 
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the third year, sharing in up to 5% of losses.79 In a “two-sided” payment model, by 
contrast, ACOs are at risk from the outset for spending beyond required thresholds 
(5% of losses in year one, 7.5% in year two, and 10% in year three) in addition to 
benefitting from shared savings.80 All one-sided ACOs will be required to convert 
into two-sided models following expiration of the initial three-year agreement 
period.81 
The maximum share of savings is higher in two-sided payment models (up to 
60% depending on outcomes for 33 quality measures) than it is for one-sided 
payment models (up to 50% depending on outcomes for 33 quality measures).82 The 
maximum share is also slightly higher (52.5%) if federally funded health providers 
such as Federally Qualified Health Centers participate in the ACO.83 Additionally, 
there is a difference in the maximum sharing cap for ACO participants.84 In one-
sided ACOs, participants may not receive a total savings distribution exceeding 10% 
of cost benchmark whereas, in two-sided models, participants may receive up to 
15% of benchmark spending levels.85 
ACO quality benchmarks fall into four basic categories: Patient/Caregiver 
Experience, Care Coordination/Patient Safety, Preventive Health, and At-Risk 
Population.86 Only At-Risk Population is based on actual patient health outcomes 
such as blood pressure level or hemoglobin control for diabetes.87 The first three are 
measured based on, respectively: patient survey responses (e.g., access to care, 
communication with provider); process measures (e.g., readmission rates, 
medication reconciliation) as reflected in medical records; and whether various 
services and screenings (e.g., mammograms, influenza immunization, smoking 
cessation intervention) are delivered or not as reflected in medical records.88 These 
measures are more focused on patient satisfaction and preventing wasteful 
allocations of health resources than with what health benefits are actually conferred 
to patients through ACO services delivered.89  
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 See Mitchell & Williams, supra note 78. 
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 See Mitchell & Williams, supra note 78. 
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 See Mitchell & Williams, supra note 78. 
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 See Mitchell & Williams, supra note 78. 
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 See Mitchell & Williams, supra note 78. 
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 See Mitchell & Williams, supra note 78. 
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 See Mitchell & Williams, supra note 78. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Guide to Quality Performance Standards for 
Accountable Care Organizations Starting in 2012: Pay for Reporting and Pay for 
Performance (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http:// www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-
Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACO-Guide-Quality-Performance-
2012.PDF. 
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 See id.; Mitchell & Williams, supra note 78. 
 
88
 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. This could be a problematic 
measurement for discerning negative health effects of ACO cost reduction measures on 
patients with health conditions falling outside the “At-Risk” domain. 
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Quality benchmarks are based on national averages.90 There are a total of 33 
indicators, 8 of which are outcomes-based and 25 of which are based on patient 
survey responses, provider compliance with internal process standards, and delivery 
of certain types of preventive health care.91 Of the 33 measures, 7 are collected via 
patient surveys, 3 are calculated via reported Medicare claims, 1 is calculated from 
EHR Incentive Program data, and 22 are collected from providers via an electronic 
group reporting interface.92  
During the first year of operation, an ACO need only completely and accurately 
report on all 33 measures for year 1 to benefit from shared savings.93 In later years, 
the ACO’s share depends on how well it performs on quality relative to the 
benchmark standard.94 For year 2, the amount of the ACO’s shared savings will 
depend on reported information for 25 of the 33 quality measures.95 For year 3 and 
onward, shared savings will depend on reported information for 32 out of 33 quality 
measures.96 Of the 33 quality indicators, 23 are assigned a numerical score and the 
remainder consists of qualitative or binary variables.97 Of the 33 quality measures 
used for ACOs, only 5 are based on clinical patient health outcomes.98 
In addition to defining quality benchmarks, CMS establishes a Minimum 
Attainment Level (“MAL”) as a percentage of the national quality standard, below 
which ACOs will not share in savings.99 Performance above the minimum but below 
the benchmark will translate into shared savings on a sliding scale based on 
proximity to the benchmark.100 The minimum level is currently set at the 30th 
percentile.101 Once an ACO surpasses the minimum standard, CMS awards points, or 
increased shares of cost savings, to ACOs on a sliding scale up to the 90th 
percentile.102 When performance exceeds this percentile, CMS awards full points, or 
the maximum allowable share of savings (50% of savings for one-sided and 60% for 
two-sided), to the ACO.103 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 86. 
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 FURROW, supra note 2, at 214-15. 
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 FURROW, supra note 2, at 214-15. 
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The total points in each of the ACO’s four quality domains are then aggregated 
and divided into all possible points for each domain.104 The ACO’s overall 
performance score is calculated by averaging the scores for each of the ACO’s four 
quality domains.105 For example, a one-sided ACO score of 90 percentage points 
would receive 90% of the 50% maximum share of savings generated, or 45% of total 
savings.106 A physician-directed committee within each ACO is responsible under 
MSSP regulations for internally overseeing and implementing the organization’s 
quality improvement program.107 
The share of savings an ACO receives also depends on its cost saving benchmark 
set by CMS.108 ACO participants receive a proportion of the difference between the 
cost benchmark and actual savings achieved by the ACO.109 As with quality 
benchmarks, CMS sets a Minimum Savings Rate (“MSR”) as a percentage of the 
benchmark above which providers must perform in order to receive any shared 
savings.110 ACO cost benchmarks are determined based on historical average 
medical expenditures per beneficiary for a given set of providers and adjusted based 
on CMS trending analysis of national Medicare expenditure data.111 Each ACO thus 
receives its own unique benchmark to meet.112 The benchmark can be adjusted for 
addition or removal of ACO participants, commencement of a new agreement term, 
or annual national growth in health care costs.113 
C.  Preliminary Cost and Quality Findings  
CMS has estimated that new ACOs will generate somewhere between $170 
million and $960 million in savings over the three-year initial agreement period.114 
Total Medicare expenditures during this period are estimated to be $1.8 trillion.115 
The ACOs approved by HHS pursuant to the MSSP began implementation in 2012 
and data is still being collected to assess effects on quality, cost, and patients.116 
There is no formal reporting, evaluation, or analysis of data based on this wave of 
implementation. 
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CMS has, however, released a report in 2011 based on results from ten ACO 
demonstration projects implemented by different types of health care entities from 
2005-2010.117 In this study, the agency found impressive gains in service quality, 
patient health outcomes, and cost reductions.118 On average, participating ACOs 
increased their quality scores overall from baseline to year 5 performance levels.119 
Specifically, ACOs increased quality by 11 percentage points on diabetes measures, 
12 points on heart failure indicators, 6 points on coronary artery disease indicators, 9 
points on cancer screening indicators, and 4 points on hypertension measures.120 
In year one, all ten ACOs improved clinical management of diabetes patients by 
attaining benchmark performance in at least 7 out of 10 clinical quality measures.121 
Two hospital-based ACOs achieved benchmark performance in all 10 measures.122 
Of the two ACOs participating in year 1 shared savings, both multi-specialty 
physician groups collectively generated a total of $9.5 million in Medicare savings in 
year 1.123 In year 2, all ten ACOs met benchmark for improving quality of care for 
chronically ill patients in at least 25 out of 27 clinical indicators for diabetes, 
coronary artery disease, and congestive heart failure.124 Five ACOs achieved 
benchmark in all 27 indicators—including two hospital-based entities, two multi-
specialty physician groups, and one integrated delivery network.125 Of the four 
ACOs participating in year 2 shared savings, including one hospital-based entity and 
three physician and multi-specialty groups, they collectively generated a total of 
$17.4 million in Medicare savings in year 2.126 
In year 3, all ten ACOs met quality benchmarks for improving quality of care for 
patients with chronic illness or who require preventive care on at least 28 out of 32 
clinical indicators, including hypertension and cancer screening.127 Two integrated 
delivery network entity ACOs achieved benchmark on all 32 indicators.128 Of the 
five ACOs participating in year 3 shared savings, including two hospital-based 
entities, one integrated delivery network, and two multi-specialty group physician 
practices, they collectively generated a total of $32.3 million in Medicare savings in 
year 3.129  
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In year 4, all ten ACOs achieved benchmark on at least 29 out of 32 quality 
measures and three ACOs achieved benchmark on all 32 indicators—two integrated 
delivery networks and one multi-specialty physician group.130 All ten ACOs 
achieved benchmark on heart failure and seven of the coronary artery disease 
measures.131 Participating ACOs increased their average overall quality scores from 
baseline to year 4 performance levels.132 Specifically, ACOs increased quality by 10 
percentage points on diabetes measures, 13 percentage points on heart failure 
indicators, 6 points on coronary artery disease indicators, 9 points on cancer 
screening indicators, and 3 points on hypertension measures.133 Total savings in year 
4 for the five ACOs participating in shared savings, including two hospital-based 
entities, one integrated delivery network, and two multi-specialty group physician 
practices, that year amounted to $38.7 million.134 
In year 5, all ten ACOs achieved benchmark performance on 30 out of 32 clinical 
quality indicators.135 Seven of these ACOs achieved benchmark performance on all 
32 performance measures—four hospital-based entities, two integrated delivery 
networks, and one physician practice group.136 All ten achieved benchmark 
performance on 10 of heart failure, 7 of coronary artery disease, and 2 of preventive 
care quality measures.137 In addition to the impressive overall quality improvements 
from baseline to year 5, the ACOs participating in shared savings in year 5, 
including two multi-specialty groups, one hospital-based entity, and one integrated 
delivery network, also generated a total of $36.2 million in Medicare savings.138 
Incentive payments that year amounted to a provider share of $29.4 million.139 
III.  CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL STARK PHYSICIAN SELF-REFERRAL LAW 
This section outlines the points of conflict between ACOs and Stark’s group 
practice regulations. It discusses the underlying purpose of Stark and its group 
practice definitions and the divergence in Stark’s and ACOs’ approach to cutting 
costs and improving quality of care. 
A.  Potential Implication of Stark 
Experts and CMS note that forming, financing, and operating ACOs will 
implicate Stark in many instances.140 In the words of CMS, “when a participating 
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physician receives a portion of the cost savings attributable to his or her efforts in 
reducing waste . . . a financial relationship is created between the hospital . . . and the 
participating physician.”141 This is because of the internal coordination required to 
operate an ACO through referrals and sharing of organizational savings and costs.142 
Absent a waiver, physician referrals within an ACO will need to satisfy one of 
Stark’s exceptions in order to avoid strict liability under the statute.143 For multi-
specialty groups and other physician group practices to meet any of Stark’s 
exceptions, they must first be properly defined as a “group practice” under the Law 
and its corresponding regulations.144 Failing to do so may subject them to, inter alia, 
civil sanctions, mandated refunds, civil monetary penalties, qui tam liability under 
the civil False Claims Act (including treble damages), and/or the ultimate death 
knell—exclusion from participation in the Medicare program.145 
Stark’s group practice definition is problematic for multi-specialty groups and 
other physician group practices seeking immunity under Stark exceptions through its 
criteria.146 First, under the Single Legal Entity Test, a group practice may not be 
owned, in whole or in part, by an entity that is, in itself, an operating medical 
practice—including a hospital.147 In Stark rulemaking, CMS indicates that a group 
practice “does not include a loose confederation of physicians, a substantial purpose 
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of which is to share profits from referrals . . . or separate group practices under 
common ownership or control through a . . . hospital or health care system.”148  
Under many ACO organizational formulations, however, hospitals may have at 
least some ownership interest in the physician and/or multi-specialty group practices 
it is affiliated with by virtue of the ACO and Participation Agreement.149 In this 
circumstance, it is unclear whether an otherwise independent physician practice 
meets Stark’s group practice definition. Additionally, under the Test, providers must 
generally bill under the same Medicare provider number.150 This is unlikely to be the 
case for ACOs, particularly those that connect otherwise independent providers that 
are billing separately. Also, as mentioned supra, there are no requirements that ACO 
participants share a Medicare provider number.151 
Stark requires physician members within group practices to provide 75% of the 
group’s aggregate services (“Substantially All Services Test”).152 Because Stark does 
not contemplate physician-hospital collaboration beyond hospital ownership of 
physician practices, it does not consider a hospital or other entity within an ACO to 
be a “member” of the group practice for purposes of Stark.153 As a result, even full-
time independent physicians in a jointly operated ACO will face serious difficulty 
meeting the service provision requirement.154 This might discourage provider 
interest in forming or operating ACOs.155 It also might necessitate hospital 
employment of physicians that would otherwise be exposed to Stark liability, 
perhaps discouraging some independent physicians from participating.156  
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Stark’s group practice definition likewise requires that 75% of patient encounters 
be handled by physicians practicing within the group and on its behalf (“Patient 
Encounters Test”).157 Many existing ACO arrangements between physicians and 
hospitals will therefore implicate Stark because hospital entities will not be 
considered “member[s] of the group” handling patient encounters.158 Physicians 
alone in the ACO may be unable to meet the 75% of patient encounters requirement, 
in which case they could be subject to civil liability for ACO referrals. 
Another conflict between the Stark group practice definition and ACOs is the 
Compensation Test under the self-referral statute’s provisions.159 Under these 
provisions, physician members may not receive any share or bonus that is directly 
related to the value or volume of referrals to an entity with which it has a financial 
relationship.160 However, certain types of productivity bonuses and profit shares 
indirectly related to referrals may be allowed for all or subsets of the group.161 This 
is only allowed, however, if services are personally performed by physicians or 
“incident to” personal performance and calculated using indirect methodologies 
based on, e.g., years of experience, patient visits, and percentage of services referred 
that do not qualify as designated health services (“DHS”) under Stark.162 
Because financial success of an ACO is linked to its referral patterns, the 
financial bonuses it receives for cost savings may conflict with the Stark 
compensation rules for group practices.163 Because ACO providers must collectively 
reduce costs while meeting patient health benchmarks,164 there is an incentive to 
refer within the ACO to monitor and manage patients’ care and its associated 
costs.165 ACOs depend on using fewer in-ACO referrals to generate more 
savings.166As a result, they will distribute shares of profits among providers that 
directly correlate to the value and/or volume of referrals they collectively provided, 
which could violate the Compensation Test. 
B.  Purpose of Stark 
The purpose of Stark generally is to assure that higher quality and medically 
appropriate services are delivered to patients through an “indirect, structural” 
approach.167 Fraud and abuse are prominent drivers of rising health care system 
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costs.168 The financial incentives available to physicians (e.g., fee-for-service 
reimbursement, ownership interest in ancillary services) supply them with the 
motive to abuse the system.169 The decentralized and administratively complex 
health care system, which obscures fraud and abuse through its layers of 
organization and responsible parties, provides them the opportunity.170 Recognizing 
this, the Stark law targets organizational structures and arrangements conducive to 
abusive practices via deterring potential violators rather than ferreting out abuse 
itself.171 
Stark’s purpose, according to CMS, is to “protect patients and the Federal health 
care programs from fraud, improper referral payments, [and] unnecessary 
utilization.”172 Some have described its aims as fostering patient choice, quality, and 
appropriate utilization through removing financial considerations from medical 
decision-making.173 Others define it as reconciling the ethical conflict-of-interest 
facing physicians seeking to capitalize on investments in providers to which they 
refer patients while maintaining professional ethical responsibility.174 Self-referral 
has the potential to restrict physicians’ disclosures to patients and, as a result, 
compromise patients’ rights to exercise informed consent and choice.175  It may 
increase the chance of misdiagnoses, which can harm patients in a myriad of ways, 
because financial incentives are motivating physician treatment and non-treatment 
rather than sound medical judgment.176 Self-referral may adversely restrict 
competition among providers to which patients may be referred.177  
All these purposes and risks, however, assume a fee-for-service reimbursement 
system that facilitates over-provision of care (and higher-than-necessary billing) 
rather than under-provision through rewards for cost saving as with ACOs.178 
Experts note the oddity of applying the federal Stark Law, “premised on limiting the 
influence of financial incentives on physicians’ referral patterns,” to an ACO model 
“expressly intended by Congress to incentivize physicians to reduce the cost of 
care.”179 This is an incomplete interpretation of the conflict, however. Although both 
Stark and ACOs do, to some degree, seek to reduce utilization of medical services, 
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the unique structures of each (e.g., strict liability deterrence versus quality reporting 
and measurement) go about doing this in vastly different ways.  
The fundamental conflict is one of means and not ends. The legislative objective 
of Stark, to prohibit physician referrals to entities with which they have financial 
relationships, is the very mechanism by which ACOs reduce aggregate medical 
expenditures and improve Medicare patient health.180 ACO providers must self-refer 
within the ACO to monitor and manage patients’ care and its associated costs.181 It is 
noteworthy, however, that the MSSP does not in fact alter fee-for-service 
reimbursement, or its overarching incentives for over-utilization, but simply allows 
bonuses derived from cost savings to discourage provision of unnecessary 
services.182 This could allow ACOs to circumvent the general payment scheme to 
discourage over-utilization by foregoing shared savings to benefit from anti-abuse, 
fraud, and kickback immunity.183 
There are various reasons for the existing group practice definition under Stark. 
These include, inter alia, that more than 40% of practicing physicians practice in a 
group setting and that Congress did not want to encumber these popular and 
presumably effective delivery arrangements.184 Group practices also constitute a 
strong lobbying arm at the federal level.185 There are practical efficiencies to be 
realized in a group setting, including the fact that physicians communicate more 
easily and patients can more quickly be seen upon referral within a group.186 Finally, 
under a managed care capitated payment system, payment to specialists will be more 
cost-effective if specialists are actually integrated with primary care providers who 
self-refer to them rather than operating as stand-alone providers receiving per-patient 
compensation for services they are unlikely to deliver to most patients.187 
C.  Stark and ACO Approaches to Achieving Shared Goals 
Until this point, physicians have not coordinated with hospitals to manage and 
deliver care to patients beyond assuming medical staffing positions and hospitals 
have done little to coordinate with physicians beyond acquiring ownership of 
practices.188 In the words of CMS, physicians have perverse incentives to over-
utilize as hospital practitioners because they are “not financially at risk for items and 
services that they use and prescribe, and therefore, do not have a financial stake in 
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controlling the hospital’s patient care costs.”189 Stark’s approach to 
physician/hospital collaboration, and the frequent changes and complexity in its 
exceptions and group practice definitions, have further discouraged provider 
collaboration.190  
CMS has issued fraud alerts indicating that physician collaboration with hospitals 
is a vehicle through which hospitals indirectly compensate physicians for self-
referral through a guaranteed, continuous stream of revenue.191 This runs counter to 
critics’ assertions that it reflects a partnership to raise capital and create needed 
efficiencies in health care delivery.192 Additionally, CMS has imposed retroactive 
modifications in rulemaking for physicians operating “under arrangements” with 
hospitals to discourage physician billing through hospitals.193 In taking these 
measures, CMS has encouraged more fee-for-service, physician-only ventures, 
arguably more predisposed to over-utilization, and discouraged joint 
hospital/physician arrangements, in which hospitals might help to curb costs.194 
Stark is both under and over-inclusive because it regulates incentives within the 
referral process in a fee-for-service system rather than directly seeking to control 
costs or assure value of care.195 As such, it can chill arrangements that ultimately 
promote cost and quality objectives because of their financially-motivated referral 
patterns while also failing to detect abusive arrangements because of highly technical 
and sometimes arbitrary guidelines as to what is and is not excepted from prohibition 
under the statute.196 If insurers could instantly determine quality and appropriateness 
of care, there would be no need for fraud and abuse laws such as Stark.197 Medicare 
would never admit patients for certain services in the first place because they would 
already know they are unnecessary or delivered by low-quality providers.198 
The problem of implementing this, however, is that it is extremely difficult for 
regulators to determine quality and appropriateness of care for patients and nearly 
impossible to evaluate it real-time to achieve specified outcomes.199 Often 
information available on quality measures is supplied directly by physicians, who are 
financially interested in the result, or patients, poorly positioned to assess the care 
they are receiving.200 This is precisely why Stark seeks to deter abusive incentive 
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structures within care processes rather than attempting to regulate decisions 
physicians make or their actual effects on patients.201 
The MSSP, however, adopts a more direct, outcome-based approach through 
requiring providers to improve electronic health records (“EHR”) tracking and 
sharing,202 coordinate more on implementing care management systems, and execute 
best practices as collaborative medical partners.203 These are all new tools through 
which ACO providers may reduce medical expenditures while maintaining specified 
patient quality thresholds.204 It also, however, injects financial incentives into the 
service delivery process through requiring the inverse of the Stark law—that 
physicians have a financial interest in the referral and treatment decisions of their 
patients—as a way to deter provision of low-quality, high-cost services.205 Other 
reforms such as payment bundling and incentives for EHR adoption by non-ACO 
providers, buttress this provider-controlled, outcome-based approach of the ACA 
statute to deliver care in a more centralized delivery and payment system.206  
The potential benefits of ACOs have led some to propose a bifurcated system of 
fraud and abuse enforcement that distinguishes between integrated systems 
implicating Stark and traditional fee-for-service systems (e.g., Medicare Part A) with 
better-understood incentives and risks for physician abuse.207 Under this approach, 
Stark requirements would be substantially relaxed or eliminated altogether for 
integrated systems because of extant internal safeguards, auditing, and pay-for-
performance standards.208 As some argue, current ACOs are already highly-
regulated, “risk-bearing” entities with substantial “self-correcting” safeguards and 
mechanisms to prevent abuse such as site visits, public disclosure, data accessibility, 
governance controls, and program integrity compliance.209 This view, however, 
discounts any value to Stark’s presence in the fee-for-service-plus-bonus delivery 
and payment system of ACOs.  
Some fear that ACOs may be entered into and operated by providers and 
suppliers not primarily to improve patient care and reduce costs, but to increase 
prices for consumers. This would be accomplished by consolidating and 
reorganizing otherwise competitive providers into centralized profit centers.210 
Relatedly, ACO providers may enter into these agreements to receive a generous 
waiver from all fraud and abuse laws even if they increase over-utilization and 
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forego receiving savings distributions,211 depending on penalties for doing so.212 
Scholars also fear that, because small or isolated physicians and hospitals will be at a 
financial disadvantage in joining or forming ACOs because of high capital and 
infrastructure costs, they may be crowded out or become extinct because of ACO 
implementation.213  
MSSP also allows EHR donations and capital contributions by hospitals that 
would otherwise be prohibited under Stark’s EHR exception, expiring in 2013,214 as 
well as payments to reduce amount of care, utilize lower-cost supplies, or influence 
referral trends within the ACO.215 The MSSP does not require arrangements to be in 
writing, signed by the parties, provided at fair market value, or be based on value or 
volume of referrals—as do many of Stark’s exceptions.216 This lack of restriction 
diminishes the accountability ordinarily expected from self-referring providers who 
stand to gain from participating in various ACO compensation arrangements.217 The 
absence of these restrictions, however, is anything but an accident. It was largely a 
response to complaints from providers during the initial public comment period 
citing fair market value and pre-determined payment requirements of Stark 
exceptions as specific barriers to ACO implementation.218 
CMS issued a proposed rule in 2008, never finalized, that created an affirmative 
Stark exception for shared savings distribution programs.219 It required that cost 
savings measures be supported by “objective, independent medical evidence” 
suggesting they would not adversely affect or represent a diminution in patient 
care.220 Likewise, all performance measures would be required to “use an objective 
methodology, be verifiable, be supported by credible medical evidence, and be 
individually tracked.”221 Such measures would also need to “reasonably relate” to 
hospital practices and its patient population.222 The program would need to conduct 
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pre-program and annual reviews to determine the effect of cost-savings practices on 
patients.223 Furthermore, CMS would have limited participating physicians entitled 
to bonuses to members of the hospital’s medical staff at the outset of ACO 
implementation and constrained timing and amount of savings distributions 
attributable to a single cost saving measure implemented through “re-basing” and 
“scaled” limitations.224  
The proposed rule would constrain the possibilities for ACOs’ organizational and 
operational structures.225 Generally, the rule contemplates applying a stricter scrutiny 
to providers’ chosen methods of cost reduction and more closely evaluating whether 
decision-making is based on patient health or financial gain.226 In its justification for 
the rule, the agency notes that “[t]he variety and complexity of these programs make 
them potential vehicles for the unscrupulous to disguise payments for referrals or 
compromise quality in the interest of maximizing revenues.”227 
The government’s identified risks of abuse resulting from shared savings 
programs include concerns of physicians limiting use of costly, but health-
improving, treatments (“stinting”), electing to treat only healthier patients (“cherry 
picking”), avoiding sick patients during rounds at the hospital (“steering”), and 
discharging patients earlier than would be clinically desirable (“quicker-sicker” 
discharge).228 More broadly, CMS was concerned that physicians would drive 
hospitals to “game the arrangement” by manipulating hospital accounts to generate 
“phantom savings” or engage in “unfair competition” toward non-ACO 
physicians.229 
CMS has continued to express reservations that ACOs may be “misused for 
fraudulent or abusive purposes that harm patients of Federal health care programs” 
despite its present waiver policy.230 It is currently monitoring ACO performance to 
automatically narrow waivers “unless information gathered . . . suggests that the 
waivers . . . are adequately protecting the Medicare program and beneficiaries.”231 In 
this case, fraud and abuse controls will become more stringent.232 Unsurprisingly, 
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ACO stakeholders have commented unfavorably on the negative framing of the 
question of waiver modification.233 It would appear to trigger narrowing of waivers 
even in the presence of ambiguous or non-existent evidence of actual fraud or abuse 
caused by ACOs. 234 
IV.  CMS’ WAIVER APPROACH AND ALTERNATIVES 
This section details the current waiver approach adopted by CMS in its Interim 
Final Rule (“IFR”). It discusses stakeholder reactions to the IFR in public comments 
and alternatives to the current CMS approach of addressing Stark-ACO conflict. 
A.  Current Waiver 
The statutory language of the MSSP delegates to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services the power to “waive such requirements of [fraud and abuse laws] as 
may be necessary to carry out the provisions” of the program.235 On November 2, 
2011, CMS issued an IFR on “Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared Savings 
Program,” effective notwithstanding subsequent public comments, after reviewing 
stakeholder comments on its more stringent proposed waiver rule (“Waiver Designs 
Notice”), issued on April 7, 2011.236 The interim final rule creates multiple ACO 
waivers for multiple purposes and functions within MSSP, as per concerns raised in 
public comments relating to the need for greater flexibility in waiver conditions to 
accommodate a “broader array of ACO activities,” including start-up, compensation, 
operations, and disposition of the entity.237  
In pertinent part, these waivers include an ACO pre-participation waiver, ACO 
participation waiver, and shared savings distributions waiver with respect to Stark 
and other fraud and abuse laws (e.g., the Anti-Kickback Statute).238 Though the rule 
segments waiver qualifications for different phases of ACO activities, it makes clear 
that “[a]n arrangement need only fit in one waiver to be protected.”239 Designed to 
facilitate flexibility and certainty for providers, the multitude of waivers does 
complicate the regulatory analysis somewhat as compared to a singular standard.240 
Nonetheless, it avoids the dreaded and costly “transaction-by-transaction” analysis 
for ACO implementers whereby they would determine legality of individual 
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transactions based on facts and circumstances rather than ensuring compliance for 
arrangements generally.241 
One of the most significant modifications to CMS’ initial proposed rule reflected 
in the interim final rule is a legal standard, “reasonably related to,” that all three 
MSSP waivers share. It concerns the nature and extent of the relationship required 
between the proposed ACO arrangement and statutory goals of the MSSP. Under 
CMS’ initial rule, an arrangement was exempt so long as it was “necessary for and 
directly related to” the statutory goals.242 Citing overwhelming criticism received 
from commenters that this standard was overly restrictive; CMS relaxed its standard 
considerably to give certainty to providers forming ACOs.243 ACO activities in the 
previous waiver rule did not cover or include expenses related to ACO formation and 
investment, including “start-up, training, hiring, and infrastructure.”244 There were 
also concerns that the “compartmentalized” approach of CMS’ initial waiver, which 
did not include financial arrangements outside of savings distributions, was not 
conducive to the variety of activities ACOs must pursue with multiple actors (e.g., 
insurers, manufacturers) at different phases of operation (e.g., start-up, wind-down) 
to succeed.245 
CMS’ standard under the IFR for relationship between any proposed ACO 
arrangement under a waiver and the MSSP’s statutory goals is that such arrangement 
be “reasonably related to” the purposes of the program.246 The pre-participation and 
participation waivers entrust this determination to the ACO’s governing body, 
whereas the shared savings distributions waiver leaves the question open-ended, 
requiring generally that distributions correspond to activities “reasonably related” to 
MSSP purposes.247 CMS’ explanation of the “reasonably related” provision of the 
waiver indicates that an ACO entity need only relate a given arrangement to any 
“one enumerated purpose” of the MSSP and that it “articulate clearly the nexus” 
between an arrangement and the respective statutory goal.248 The boundaries of what 
constitutes a sufficient nexus or satisfactory explanation are unclear, though CMS 
does provide in regulations a non-exhaustive, but nonetheless extensive, list of 
covered “start-up” activities.249 CMS defines “start-up activities” quite broadly as 
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“items services facilities, or goods . . . used to create or develop an ACO.”250 These 
include network development, capital investment, infrastructure creation, clinical 
management systems, legal fees, hiring, and IT resources.251 
This broad language affords ACO arrangements considerable flexibility for 
financial transactions and contributions as compared to traditional Stark exceptions 
or previous CMS waivers for shared savings.252 There is no guarantee, however, that, 
in ensuring cost reduction measures are related to the goals of the MSSP, such 
measures will not nevertheless create abusive referrals or under-utilization. For 
instance, hospitals are now allowed under this rule to directly make compensation 
payments to ACO physicians for reducing patient duration of stay, readmission, and 
contracting with low-cost suppliers.253 Regulations do indicate that ACO participants 
should “exercise diligence” in ensuring arrangements comply with this standard and 
that governing bodies specifically indicate their “bases for determinations” of 
reasonable relatedness.254 The AMA indicated in final rule comments that it does not 
wish for CMS to add to this list or further delineate specific practices that are 
acceptable,255 reflecting a desire to maximize providers’ discretionary control over 
how ACOs are structured. 
The requirements for the pre-participation, participation, and shared savings 
distributions waivers for ACOs are distinct, though consistent in many respects. Pre-
participation waivers are designed to facilitate proposed ACOs attracting necessary 
capital, investment, and contributions of infrastructure that might be otherwise 
prohibited.256 They require, inter alia, that parties enter into the arrangement with 
“good faith intent” to form an ACO, include at least one party of the type eligible to 
form an ACO, take “diligent steps” to develop an eligible ACO, and provide 
“contemporaneous documentation” of all phases of formation and execution of an 
ACO arrangement to create an “audit trail.”257 Requirements for the participation 
waiver are quite similar, except that they obligate ACO participants to be in “good 
standing” under the MSSP such that governance, leadership and management 
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structures satisfy all MSSP requirements.258 The shared savings distributions waiver 
is also similar, except that it requires savings to be earned during the term of the 
participation agreement and distributed only to entities who were ACO participants 
or providers during the years in which the savings were actually earned.259 
B.  Public Comments Received on CMS’ Interim Final Waiver Rule 
There were numerous comments received in response to the IFR on MSSP 
Waivers issued by CMS. The following includes highlights from public comment on 
the current waivers for ACOs and concerns raised by prominent commenters about 
effects of ACOs on patients and the appropriate scope of waivers for Stark and other 
fraud and abuse laws. 
The American Hospital Association (“AHA”) was pleased with the waivers and 
the “reasonably related” requirement and recommended finalizing them as-is.260 
AHA did complain, however, that the rule’s request for comments to narrow the 
wavier and provide more definition or specificity frustrated the “certainty” and 
“latitude” the IFR intended to afford ACO participants.261 Certainty is required, 
according to AHA, to “develop the infrastructure necessary” for ACOs and 
encourage “beneficial innovation” in service delivery.262 AHA opposed the rule’s 
presumption of automatically narrowing waivers without a notice and comment 
period absent evidence that fraud and abuse is not occurring.263 AHA argued this 
imposes too exacting a standard on CMS if it desires to maintain waivers as it 
requires it to “prove a negative.”264 AHA asserts the structure of ACOs and their 
quality and financial reporting will safeguard against abuse by medical providers so 
long as they comport with current waiver requirements.265 AHA suggested that CMS 
use monitoring tools to take corrective action against individual ACOs that are 
abusive rather than base its entire policy on such risks.266 
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) argued that “it is important to 
codify” the existing waivers in the IFR rather than permit them to be again changed 
in the near term to “assure prospective participants of their permanence.”267 The 
AMA voiced concern about CMS’ indication in the IFR that shared savings 
distribution waivers would not extend to private ACOs not authorized under the 
MSSP and offered to help CMS “identify comparable private payer 
arrangements.”268 It also asked CMS to extend the EHR exception under Stark 
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beyond the 2013 expiration currently set by statute for purposes of ACOs and EHR 
adoption generally.269 
The American Physical Therapy Association (“APTA”) submitted two separate 
comments to the IFR, one from the entire Association and another from its Private 
Practice Section.270 The Association starts by arguing that the existing In-Office 
Ancillary Services exception to Stark results in “abusive financial arrangements” 
whereby physicians steer patients to in-house physical therapy services to increase 
practice profits.271 The Association contends these arrangements are created “solely 
for profit” and without regard to the “best interest of the Medicare beneficiary.”272 It 
is concerned that waivers associated with ACO implementation will only exacerbate 
this behavior and harm independent physical therapist practitioners in the process.273 
APTA argues that quality metrics used by MSSP to evaluate ACOs “do not contain 
the adequate measures to ensure that arrangements . . . truly result in improved 
quality of care” and, therefore, cannot substitute for Stark in protecting patients (and 
physical therapists) from abusive referrals.274 
APTA argues that the waivers’ “reasonably related” standard is broad enough to 
cover most any arrangement and delivery of items or services within an ACO.275 It 
recommends CMS narrow the language and articulate the nexus required for an 
activity to sufficiently further ACO objectives.276 At a minimum, APTA argues the 
waiver protection should only be extended to activities for beneficiaries attributed to 
the ACO.277 Immunity for non-ACO business will only create, according to APTA, 
new avenues for abuse and confer to ACOs an unfair market advantage over non-
ACO providers.278 Finally, APTA recommends, in lieu of the current approach, that 
CMS establish “bright line safeguards” that balance the need for flexibility in ACO 
implementation with protection from abuses associated with physician ownership of 
DHS.279 
The Private Practice Sections’ comment is considerably more vocal about the 
potential for physician abuses within ACOs.280 The Section focuses specifically on 
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ACOs causing “underutilization, stinting of care, [and] lapses in quality” that will 
benefit physicians at the expense of patients.281 The Section took issue with the 
“reasonably related” standard, noting that it was “vague and ambigu[ous]” and 
“broad and loose.”282 This, according to the Section, is over-inclusive because it 
covers any kind of ACO inducement and will prompt physician abuse because of the 
lenient standard and lack of safeguards.283 The Section anecdotally cited “creative 
business arrangements” designed to avoid the self-referral prohibition as evidence 
that physicians should not receive leeway in ACO implementation.284 Moreover, it 
noted that, if the penalty or shared savings received by participants in ACOs are not 
greater than the gain from self-referral, they may nonetheless use ACOs to increase 
utilization and profits under the fee-for-service payment system.285 
The Section was concerned about CMS’ “broad, permissive” pre-participation 
waivers granted for start-up arrangements.286 Because the waiver currently allows a 
hospital or insurance company to donate a “complete [EHR] system as well as 
training and ongoing technical support” free of charge, the Section believes the 
inducement will corrupt ACO physicians’ decision-making to the benefit of the 
donor.287 It further recommended requiring specific arrangements and their 
descriptions to be disclosed to patients and the general public and memorialized in 
signed writings.288 The Section was also concerned about CMS allowing ACO 
participants to use savings distributions to later transact with “downstream” private 
insurers not involved with the ACO.289 The Section noted that these payments 
increased the risk of physician abuse and were more likely to be sensitive to volume 
or value of referrals even if “reasonably related” to ACO objectives.290 
The Section recommends incorporating prohibitions against exclusivity and 
commercial reasonableness/fair market value requirements into waiver eligibility.291 
It proposed to require ACO participants not to use shared savings to transact with 
outside parties as this would delegate care provision to “workers not recognized by 
Medicare.”292 Finally, it recommended a return to the initial proposed rule’s standard 
that arrangements be “necessary for and directly related to” ACO objectives in order 
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to qualify for waiver from Stark and other fraud and abuse laws to screen out abusive 
practices with little benefit.293 
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) were 
generally pleased with the IFR.294 Specifically, they appreciated anti-kickback 
immunity afforded by pre-participation and participation waivers to arrangements 
between ACOs and drug manufacturers.295 They did, however, discuss previous OIG 
advisory opinions regarding gain-sharing arrangements of cost savings between 
hospitals and physicians and incentive payments in the 2009 Medicare fee 
schedule.296 While the features and requirements of these arrangements are not 
identical to ACOs, the incentives created by and principles underlying shared 
savings are similar.297 Risks for patient harm identified by OIG included providers 
cherry-picking patients, stinting patient services, and receiving payments to self-refer 
or reduce services.298 
PhRMA recommends that CMS adopt the safeguards recommended by OIG in 
these advisory opinions, including: ACO assurance that physicians can use and 
prescribe pre-ACO items and services; heightened public transparency of 
arrangements and accountability for individual physicians; written disclosures of 
specific arrangements to patients; and greater limitation on duration and amount of 
financial rewards to be realized by ACOs.299 PhRMA also, similarly to the APTA, 
notes the limitations of the existing set of quality measures used by the MSSP in 
evaluating ACOs, observing that the categories “do not encompass many diseases or 
conditions that frequently affect Medicare beneficiaries.”300 
C.  Alternative Approaches 
There are a number of alternative approaches to the current waiver structure 
adopted by CMS.301 One is for CMS to conduct an individualized review of 
applications for waiver and grant or deny requests based on the circumstances and 
risks involved in each particular case.302 This would preserve the existing Stark 
framework in scenarios where it is needed and allow CMS more flexibility and input 
into when the tradeoff between cost savings and risk for abuse favors enforcement. 
This option could, however, be costly for applicants and CMS to administer and 
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might discourage prospective ACOs from forming because of the additional review 
time and uncertainty of approval compared to self-implementing waivers.303 
Another option would be for CMS to issue a waiver that prevents shared savings 
or care management fees from triggering a “financial relationship” within the 
meaning of Stark, at least so long as providers adhere to ACO safeguards relating to 
transparency, program integrity, and performance management.304 Alternately, the 
Stark waiver could be conditioned upon ACO providers meeting additional fraud 
and abuse-oriented safeguards such as “quality of care process or outcome 
standards”305 (e.g., give patients more options for referrals, track referral outcomes 
through EHR). This would ensure that patient health, satisfaction, and choice are not 
compromised as a result of cost reduction reforms in ACO delivery. Its success will 
depend on the extent to which MSSP safeguards and reporting/quality standards 
prevent abuse.306 As noted by Madison, there is a plethora of concerns and 
complications to the effectiveness of quality data collection and reporting in terms of 
achieving various outcomes for patients.307 
Another approach would be a waiver of Stark constraining the level of 
remuneration paid to ACO providers through savings distributions.308 This option 
would be more restrictive than existing waivers because it limits rewards to savings 
distributions and excludes financial arrangements with outside investors or 
partners.309 An advantage of this, however, is that it limits the scope of the waiver to 
necessary and agreed-upon functions in ACO operation.310 Conversely, as ACO 
stakeholders point out in CMS waiver rulemaking, it reduces ACO participants’ 
flexibility by constraining their participation in EHR or care management donations, 
start-up funding and investment, and inducements to attract stakeholders.311 Critics, 
by contrast, note the potential for the overbroad “latitude” currently afforded to 
providers to engage in any financial arrangement “reasonably related” to ACO 
purposes to foster abuse by providers at the expense of patients.312 
V.  RECOMMENDATION 
CMS’ current policy is to “wait and see” if and to what extent ACOs pose any 
fraud and abuse harm to patients and the Medicare program.313 The benefits of “wait 
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and see” are readily apparent. Assuming CMS can accurately identify when and 
where fraud and abuse is occurring,314 it will be able to better understand its causes 
and nature than one who is relying on theoretical predictions without observation. 
This will enable the agency to craft more tailored, effective, and appropriate long-
term solutions to the problems actually occurring in the system. It would not 
incorporate, however, those effects from abuse that are unobserved or unobservable 
and, thus, not reflected in the data. Another benefit to a “wait and see” approach is 
that it pacifies ACO implementers in the short-term, ensuring that the delivery model 
has a chance to launch and begin generating results. It buys CMS more time to 
devise a sustainable strategy for addressing the difficult question of how to reconcile 
the fraud and abuse laws and the MSSP. It also grants CMS additional time to win 
support from the industry after its strong negative reaction to the initial proposed 
waiver that substantially restricted protections afforded to ACO operations from 
Stark and other fraud and abuse laws. 
Experts and previous experience suggest that ACO providers will behave in 
predictable ways to maximize revenues and reduce their costs.315 This suggests that 
deregulating ACO provider activity through looser standards than previously 
allowed under Stark will, at least in some circumstances, harm patients and the 
Medicare program without a Stark-like method to discourage abuse.316 For example, 
the pre-participation waiver currently exempts any activity that can be considered 
“reasonably related’ to “encouraging investment in infrastructure” and the 
participation waiver covers activity “reasonably related” to ACO efforts to 
“promot[e] accountability for the . . . cost” of care delivered to Medicare 
beneficiaries.317 This creates a vacuum of regulation that will be filled with ACO 
activity that is legitimate and abusive, necessary and unnecessary, and beneficial and 
harmful.318 Without a mechanism to balance these risks and concerns or otherwise 
distinguish between activities that are legitimate and those that are not, CMS is 
entrusting patients’ and Medicare’s protection from fraud and abuse laws to private 
self-regulation without much incentive to guard against abuse concerns beyond the 
MSSP program requirements. 
Fashioning an ex ante solution has its costs as well. It runs the risk of 
inaccurately pre-determining the fraud and abuse problems of ACOs before they can 
be diagnosed. This could unnecessarily restrict beneficial activities of ACO 
providers and participants and hamper innovation in service delivery.319 The task of 
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actually measuring and understanding the harmful effects of ACO operations on 
patients and Medicare, however, is likely much more daunting than suggested by 
CMS’ rulemaking.320 There are limits to existing data collection and statistical 
techniques, interpreting information that is self-reported and evaluated, and assessing 
medical judgments of practitioners afforded discretion in determining what 
treatments are best for patients.321 All present numerous challenges to regulators 
attempting to visualize all the costs and benefits of ACOs.  
Another potential drawback to reconciling Stark and the MSSP at this juncture is 
that—at least to some degree—the two may be irreconcilable. As noted earlier, the 
mechanism by which ACOs reduce expenditures, in-ACO referrals to providers that 
will limit or provide cheaper services in return for a share of savings to the referring 
physician, runs directly afoul of Stark’s prohibition against self-referral.322 Given the 
interrelatedness and complexity of existing Stark exceptions, however, it might be 
difficult to fashion an appropriate modification at this time for ACOs through 
statutory or regulatory change to Stark. 
Based on the evidence discussed supra regarding the positive results of ACOs for 
patients both in terms of improving quality and reducing overall costs, CMS 
adopting a “wait and see” approach through an interim waiver is probably the best 
approach at this juncture. It gives physicians and hospitals a chance to implement 
ACOs in good faith without undue interference from fraud and abuse laws crafted on 
an entirely different payment and delivery model. It also minimizes cost of error for 
CMS because it can review 2012 empirical results from the Medicare ACOs 
currently being implemented, about which there is no data presently, rather than 
resort to conjecture based on previous integration attempts. Finally, it will give CMS 
the greatest possible flexibility to make changes later as opposed to finalizing a 
regulatory structure now that is undoubtedly going to change as ACOs permeate the 
national delivery system and generate unknown future results for patients and 
providers. 
It would, however, be beneficial for ACO providers to adopt some additional 
modest safeguards to ensure that implementation does not veer too far from MSSP 
policies. This could include CMS requiring more direct disclosures to patients about 
the arrangements in which physicians are participating and financial relationships 
created. Without these, signage and automatic attribution of patients to ACO 
networks will fail to give adequate notice to beneficiaries of changes in their 
Medicare services. Additionally, CMS should require that arrangements be in 
writing and contain certain specific terms of the agreement. This would guard 
against any overt circumvention of CMS’ requirements for ACOs by increasing 
transparency and documentation available to regulators and the public. Finally, using 
existing MSSP channels of oversight such as site visits and auditing during this 
initial implementation phase will be instructive to CMS monitoring efforts. It will 
also ensure that ACOs are working toward their promised objectives of cost 
reduction and improving patient health outcomes. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Based on the unique payment and delivery structure of ACOs and early empirical 
evidence of their positive effects on patients, this Article recommends retaining 
existing waivers along with some modest safeguards.323 Based on comments 
received during waiver rulemaking, it is clear that ACO participants require 
extensive latitude and flexibility to carry out their arrangements and meet target 
benchmarks for cost and quality performance.324 Though there are strong arguments 
on both sides for less or more fraud and abuse protection in the ACO context, there 
is insufficient data right now to determine whether either side’s contentions are 
realized in the market.325 Until then, a broad and flexible waiver from CMS will 
provide regulators and industry participants alike the information they need to make 
more informed decisions about how to operate and regulate ACOs. 
 
                                                          
 
323
 See supra Part IV. 
 
324
 See Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 
67992, 67996-97 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. chapter IV and 42 C.F.R. Chapter 
V). 
 
325
 See Madison, supra note 167, at 419-25. 
